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JUDGMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT AND THE SOUTH
AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT AS A
BASIS FOR A UNIVERSAL METHOD TO
RESOLVE CONFLICTS BETWEEN
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
DANIEL H. ERSKINE*
ABSTRACT
This article describes the methods utilized by the United
States Supreme Court to resolve specific cases involving conflicts
between federal constitutional rights, a federal constitutional
right and a state constitutional or statutory right, and an inter-
national treaty right and a federal constitutional right. Consid-
eration of particular decisions representative of the manner in
which the Court resolves conflicts between rights in the three ty-
pologies described above illustrates how the Court views such
conflicts and the rationales employed to resolve apparent conflict-
ing rights.
The rationales used by the United States Supreme Court will
be compared to the South African Constitutional Court's deci-
sions in the Soobramoney, Grootboom, and South African Broad-
casting Corp. Ltd. cases. The first two of these cases deal with
conflicting socio-economic constitutional rights, while the third
case addresses conflicting civil-political constitutional rights. By
comparing the reasoning utilized by both courts, this article illus-
* B.A., J.D., LL.M. in International & Comparative Law. This article is based upon a
paper presented at an International Conference on Conflicting Fundamental Rights held
at Ghent University, Belgium on 15-16 December 2006. The author, admitted to the prac-
tice of law in New York and Connecticut, engages in the private practice of law in both
New York and Connecticut.
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trates distinct judicial methods applied to rationally resolve con-
flicts between significant individual rights.
Both the United States and South African cases address the re-
lationship between constitutional rights. In each instance, the
high courts tackle problematic themes associated with the consti-
tutional rights asserted and attempt to reconcile conflicts be-
tween rights in a manner that reaffirms each right's sanctity,
while maintaining their respective Constitution's internal consis-
tency. The comparison serves to permit presentation of a univer-
sal method to resolve conflicting fundamental rights for judicial
authorities to use across the broad array of legal situations in
which conflicts between significant rights occurs.
INTRODUCTION
"Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent
national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights
granted him by the constitution or by law." Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, Art. 8, G.A. res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 at
75(1948).
The preservation and protection of fundamental rights within
the domestic legal order occurs primarily through constitutional
courts of final appeal. These courts render decisive conclusions
to the extent that a municipal legal regime will enforce or un-
dermine rights guaranteed under domestic legislation. Explora-
tion of the rationales employed by these judicial bodies in expli-
cating fundamental rights within the national sphere is the
subject under examination in this work.1
Since a survey of all such final arbiters of constitutional rights
decision-making is not practicable, this assessment of the deci-
sions articulated by the United States Supreme Court and the
South African Constitutional Court endeavors to illuminate the
methods utilized and the reasons put forth in determining fun-
1 See generally Thomas Poole, Legitimacy, Rights and Judicial Review, 25 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 697 (2005) (analyzing the theoretical underpinnings of rights as determined
by judicial bodies); see also Yuval Eylon & Alon Harel, The Right to Judicial Review, 92
VA. L. REV. 991 (2006) (arguing philosophical grounds for judicial determination of in-
fringement of rights).
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damental rights in the domestic context. 2 Presentation of a uni-
versal method to resolve conflicting fundamental rights is possi-
ble by comparing and contrasting specific decisions rendered by
these courts. 3 Such a method provides the hope that all rights
that are deemed fundamental are vigorously protected and pre-
served.4
The framework for accomplishing the above task is the discus-
sion of three typologies of cases decided by the United States Su-
preme Court and four cases resolved by the South African Con-
stitutional Court. 5 The three United States rubrics under
inspection are cases involving conflicts between federal constitu-
tional rights, a federal constitutional right and a state constitu-
tional or statutory right, and an international treaty right and
federal constitutional right.6 The South African cases are Soo-
2 See Geo Quinot, The Right to Die in American and South African Constitutional Law,
37 COMP. & INT'L L.J. S. AFR. 139 (2004) (highlighting differences between the Supreme
Court of the United States and South African Constitutional Court in fundamental rights
jurisprudence, in the right to die context).
3 The selection of these two courts is deliberate, since both occupy similar jurisdictional
authority to produce binding interpretations of constitutional provisions. See S. AFR.
CONST. s. 167; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). See generally Bradford R.
Clark, Symposium, The Constitutional Origins of Judicial Review: Unitary Judicial Re-
view, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 319 (2003); Michael J. Gerhardt, Lindquist & Vennum Sym-
posium, The Future of the Supreme Court: Institutional Reform and Beyond: Super Prece-
dent, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1204, 1208-09 (2006); David E. Marion, Judicial Faithfulness or
Wandering Indulgence? Original Intentions and the History of Marbury v. Madison, 57
ALA. L. REV. 1041 (2006); Albie Sachs, Constitutional Developments in South Africa, 28
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 695 (1996); Albie Sachs, Symposium, South Africa's Unconstitu-
tional Constitution: The Transformation from Power to Lawful Power, 41 ST. LOUIS L.J.
1249 (1997); Albie Sachs, The Creation of South Africa's Constitution, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 669 (1997); Jeremy Sarkin, The Political Role of the South African Constitutional
Court, 114 S. AFR. L.J. 134 (1997).
4 Cf. Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J.
1225 (1999) (articulating possible benefits of comparative scholarship to domestic consti-
tutional precepts, if undertaken in particularly mindful method of appropriateness of bor-
rowing or evaluating foreign constitutional concepts within a social and cultural context).
5 See Ran Hirschl, The Question of Case Selection in Comparative Constitutional Law,
53 AM. J. CoMP. L. 125, 132-33 (2005) (listing case selection methods the comparative
constitutionalist should employ to increase value and quality of scholarship to field as
whole).
6 See generally DANIEL A FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 2005) (discussing intellectual origins, ratification process, and post-
civil war amendments to the American Constitution, reproducing various drafts of the
Constitution and Bill of Rights, and noting the Supreme Court's use of constitutional his-
tory in its decisions); see also DAVID M. O'BRIEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLITICS
VOLS. 1-2 (6th ed. 2005) (outlining Supreme Court decisions in various areas of interpreta-
tion of constitutional amendments).
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bramoney v. Minister of Health7 and Government of the Republic
of South Africa v. Grootboom,8 which involve conflicts between
constitutional socio-economic rights, and South African Broad-
casting Corporation Ltd.9 that addresses the political-civil rights
of fair trial and freedom of expression. A fourth South African
case, Treatment Action Campaign,10 will receive limited analysis
as it relates to international treaty rights conflicting with consti-
tutional rights.
This work is divided into four parts. The first part discusses
United States Supreme Court cases dealing with conflicts be-
tween federal constitutional rights and compares these decisions
with those of the South African Constitutional Court in South Af-
rican Broadcasting Corp. Ltd. and Soobramoney. The second
part addresses the opinions of the United States Supreme Court
resolving conflicts between a federal constitutional right and a
state constitutional or statutory right and contrasts these opin-
ions with that of the Constitutional Court in Grootboom. The
third part presents the United States Supreme Court's resolution
of conflicts between a federal constitutional right and an interna-
tional treaty right and compares this jurisprudence with Treat-
ment Action Campaign and the South African cases previously
mentioned. The fourth and final part of this work presents a
universal method for resolving conflicts between fundamental
rights, which all judicial authorities may employ to both preserve
and protect fundamental rights in conflict. 1'
7 1997 (12) B.C.L.R. 1696 (CC) (S. Afr.).
8 2000 (11) B.C.L.R. 1169 (CC) (S. Afr.).
9 Case CCT 58/06 (21 September 2006), available at http://www.constitutionalcourt.org
.zaluhtbin/hyperion-image/J-CCT58-06 (last visited Nov. 4, 2007).
10 Minister of Health v. Treatment Campaign 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC).
11 Cf. Erika de Wet, The International Constitutional Order, 55 INT'L COMP. L. Q. 51
[U.K.] (2006) (arguing for the increasing concept of an international constitution, inde-
pendent and coexistent with municipal constitutions providing definite precepts impact-
ing national jurisprudence).
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I. U.S. FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND SOUTH AFRICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
A. Estes v. Texas compared to South African Broadcasting Corp.
Ltd.
The South African Constitutional Court recently addressed, for
the first time, the propriety of televising court proceedings. A
comparison of the United States Supreme Court's first opinion on
televising similar proceedings initiates the discussion of the con-
ception, rationales, and processes utilized by these different judi-
cial bodies. The comparison is apt because the courts are tack-
ling similar issues in the first instance, albeit in differing
historical periods.
i. Estes v. Texas
The United States Supreme Court first addressed the constitu-
tionality of televising court proceedings in 1965.12 The Court dis-
cussed whether a criminal defendant's Fourteenth Amendment
constitutional right of due process was violated because televi-
sion cameras were present in the courtroom and broadcasted his
trial. 13 Actually, the only portions of the trial broadcast live and
with sound were two preliminary hearings, opening and closing
State arguments, the jury's return of the verdict, and the trial
judge's receipt of the jury verdict; additional portions of the trial
(not including any defense counsel summations) were silently
videotaped for later broadcast. 14
12 See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) (reversing conviction because petitioner was
denied due process of law by the circus atmosphere at trial); see also Daniel H. Erskine,
An Analysis of the Legality of Television Cameras Broadcasting Juror Deliberations in a
Criminal Case, 39 AKRON L. REV. 701, 701 (2006) (discussing that "most recent judicial
opinion to confront the problem of televising jury room deliberations in a capital criminal
case took place in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals."); see also The Supreme Court
Term, 1964, Fair Trial: Televising of State Criminal Trial, 79 HARv. L. REV. 146 (1965-
1966) (describing case and contemporary reaction to ruling).
13 See Estes, 381 U.S. at 534-35. The pertinent portion of the Fourteen Amendment
reads "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law .. U." .S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
14 See id. at 536 ("These initial hearings were carried live by both radio and television,
and news photography was permitted throughout.").
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The Court addressed the defendant's Sixth Amendment consti-
tutional guarantee to public trial and asserted this assurance re-
quired that a criminal defendant be "fairly dealt with and not un-
justly condemned."15 A defendant's right to a public trial coexists
with the general public's right to access the courtroom, so the
Court decided the press, under the First Amendment constitu-
tional right to freedom of the press, retains the same privilege as
the general public to access the courtroom. 16 Physical access to
the courtroom by the press did not amount to a right to televise
court proceedings because such broadcast did not, in the Court's
opinion, contribute to the attainment of truth.17 Therefore, the
Court found a violation of the defendant's right to due process be-
cause the intrusion of television cameras into the courtroom
negatively impacted the jurors, which, the Court opined, was the
greatest reason to find the defendant's trial lacking in fairness. 18
At the time of the Court's decision, forty-eight states and all
twelve circuits of the federal judiciary denied the media the abil-
ity to televise trials. 19
To conceptualize the decision of the Court in terms of conflict-
ing rights, the Court found one right, due process, to be superior
to other apparently coequal rights. The right of the criminal de-
fendant to a public trial coexisted with his right to a fair trial to
satisfy his right of due process, but the press' right to be unen-
15 See id. at 538-39. The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution reads in the pertinent
portion: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial .... U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
16 See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Govern-
ment for a redress of grievances."); see also Estes, 381 U.S. at 540; see also Pennekamp v.
Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946) (challenging the affirmance of convictions and sentences for
contempt of court entered by respondent state court); see also Bridges v. California, 314
U.S. 252 (1941) (discussing the right of the press to report on an ongoing trial inside the
courtroom).
17 See Estes, 381 U.S. at 544. This sentiment appears to be a strong impetus for banning
all television cameras in any federal court.
18 Id. at 545. The Court voiced its additional other concerns: "The quality of the testi-
mony in criminal trials will often be impaired." Id. at 547. "A major aspect of the problem
is the additional responsibilities the presence of television places on the trial judge." Id. at
548. "Finally, we cannot ignore the impact of courtroom television on the defendant." Id.
at 549. Yet, the Court conceded: "At the outset the notion should be dispelled that tele-
casting is dangerous because it is new. It is true that our empirical knowledge of its full
effect on the public, the jury or the participants in a trial, including the judge, witnesses
and lawyers, is limited." Id. at 541.
19 Id. at 544.
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cumbered by restrictive legal conditions failed to engender analo-
gous justification. 20 This result occurred because the Court placed
greater weight on due process than access or transparency of the
proceedings. 21 The Court sought to reconcile conflicting rights by
producing a proportional state where each right exists within a
singular realm, but the space occupied by each right is dissimilar
or proportional to the value associated with the right by the
Court. Some rights, like due process, garner greater weight
based upon the Court's evaluation of the factual situation as a
whole. Less valuable rights must cede value to fundamental
rights with assigned greater value.
The Court permits the right of greater value to supersede other
rights, but the Court does not negate the guarantees of the lesser
valued rights.22 Instead, less valuable rights, in the Court's esti-
mation, exist at a lower level of enforcement. These rights exist,
but must accommodate the primary position of the most valuable
right. There is no doubt that reconciliation between rights, in a
sense, is achieved by permitting media access to trial proceed-
ings, while not constitutionalizing the right to televise court pro-
ceedings. The preeminent right of due process circumscribes
other rights, but does not establish a rule that all media coverage
of a criminal trial violates due process. The result harmonizes
rights in the given factual situation, but fractionalizes rights into
certain delineated values, which establish one right to govern the
scope of all other rights.
ii. South African Broadcasting Corp. Ltd.
The South African Constitutional Court addressed whether the
national broadcasting company possessed a "right to broadcast
the entire proceedings [of the Supreme Court of Appeal] live on
television and radio, as well as the right to produce edited high-
lights packages for television and radio audiences."23 The pro-
20 A prior restraint on the press in the context of a criminal trial is impermissible. See
Okla. Publ'g Co. v. Dist. Ct. of Okla., 430 U.S. 308, 311 (1977); see also Neb. Press Ass'n v.
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
21 Cf. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 603 (1982) (asserting First
Amendment to includes right of access to criminal trials, to ensure Amendment's underly-
ing precept of advocating informed discussions of governmental affairs).
22 In other cases, the Court has utilized the terminology of qualified or presumptive
right. See Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1979).
23 S. Afr. Broad. Corp. Ltd., Case CCT 58/06 at 6. The press had access to the proceed-
ing by physical presence absent electronic devices. Id. at 52.
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ceedings were an appellate action of criminal convictions for cor-
ruption. 24 The Court examined the constitutional rights of a de-
fendant to fair trial and the media's freedom of expression. 25 The
right to freedom of expression contained in Section 16 of the Con-
stitution includes "(a) freedom of the press and other media;
[and] (b) freedom to receive or impart information or ideas."26 The
right to fair trial is composed of numerous subsidiary rights.
27
Coupled with these enumerated rights, the values of dignity,
freedom, and equality are incorporated into the substance of the
right to a fair trial. 28 Together with the principles underlying the
right to public trial, the precept of open society is established.
29
24 Id. at T 4, 5 (civil forfeiture order also under appeal related to criminal convictions).
25 Id. at 7 14, 15 (discussing the issues before the court).
26 S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 16(a)-(b) available at http://www.info.gov.zaldocuments
/constitution/1996/96cons2.htm# 16.
27 These rights are:
(a) to be informed of the charge with sufficient detail to answer it;
(b) to have adequate time and facilities to prepare a defence; (c) to a
public trial before an ordinary court; (d) to have their trial begin and
conclude without unreasonable delay; (e) to be present when being
tried; (f) to choose, and be represented by, a legal practitioner, and to
be informed of this right promptly; (g) to have a legal practitioner as-
signed to the accused person by the state and at state expense, if sub-
stantial injustice would otherwise result, and to be informed of this
right promptly; (h) to be presumed innocent, to remain silent, and not
to testify during the proceedings; (i) to adduce and challenge evidence;
(j) not to be compelled to give self-incriminating evidence; (k) to be
tried in a language that the accused person understands or, if that is
not practicable, to have the proceedings interpreted in that language;
(1) not to be convicted for an act or omission that was not an offence
under either national or international law at the time it was commit-
ted or omitted; (m) not to be tried for an offence in respect of an act or
omission for which that person has previously been either acquitted or
convicted; (n) to the benefit of the least severe of the prescribed pun-
ishments if the prescribed punishment for the offence has been
changed between the time that the offence was committed and the
time of sentencing; and (o) of appeal to, or review by, a higher court.
S. Ar. Const. ch. 2, § 35(3). Everyone has the right to have any dis-
pute that can be resolved by the application of law decided in a fair
public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another inde-
pendent and impartial tribunal or forum. S. Mr. Const. ch. 2, § 34. A
public hearing, however, does not include an automatic right to live
televised broadcast of the trial. S. Afr. Broad. Corp. Ltd., 2006 (CC)
51.
28 Id. at 22 ("[E]mbracing 'a concept of substantive fairness which is not to be equated
with what might have passed muster in our criminal courts before the Constitution came
into force."').
29 Id. at 50 (stating that both arguments of a right to a public trial and a fair trial
must be considered separately).
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Open society promotes accountability of the judiciary to the peo-
ple. 30
The Court reasoned determination of which right prevailed in
this situation was inappropriate, and framed the question to be
resolved as "how best to give effect to the requirement of the
Constitution that the appeal hearing be both 'fair' and 'public."' 3'
Consideration of how to effectuate both rights rejects the "model
of 'clashing' rights in which one right had to prevail at the ex-
pense of the other."32 The more appropriate test, the Court
opined, is to reconcile conflicting fundamental rights that impact
upon each other in the factual context presented. 33 However, this
test must be applied against the backdrop of circumstances that
require one right to take precedence over another right, despite
the fact that the Constitution does not formulate such rights in a
hierarchical manner.34
The Court's survey of global jurisprudence revealed that a gen-
eral right to broadcast live court proceedings does not exist in
other democratic societies. 35 Further, in this instance, a third
party asserted this non-existent right over the objections of all
litigants. 36 The Court upheld the lower court's prohibition on
television and radio broadcast of the proceedings, but issued
guidance on how future resolution of similar situations should be
evaluated.37
Particularly, the Court raised concerns with televising court
proceedings because of the "intense impact" upon the viewer's
perception and the distortion of the actual manner legal matters
were presented in court by broadcast media edits.38 The potential
for manipulation and distortion of televised court proceedings
30 Id. (noting that open justice does not lead to absolute right of access by public and
press to judicial proceedings).
31 S. Afr. Broad. Corp. Ltd., 2006 (CC) T 47 (emphasis in original) (S. Mr.).
32 Id. at 48.
33 Id. at 53 (explaining the appropriate measure for a court to determine whether
broadcasting proceedings are within the interests of justice); see id. at 51 (including the
interests of justice in this context).
34 S. Afr. Broad. Corp. Ltd., 2006 (CC) 55 (stating certain rights to take precedence
over others).
35 Id. at 58, 60 (citing to scholarly work by Eric Barendt regarding the general right
to broadcast live court proceedings).
36 Id. at 59 (explaining the opposition to the broadcast of court proceedings).
37 Id. at T 67, 68 (holding that prohibition of broadcasting proceedings to be valid).
38 S. Afr. Broad. Corp. Ltd., 2006 (CC) 68 (stating the impact television has in possi-
bly distorting the character of court proceedings).
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through editing raised concerns about assuring the right to fair
trial-and for this reason, full live broadcasts are preferred over
an edited highlight, sound-byte format.3 9 Justice, therefore, re-
quires the fortification of constitutional rights through guaran-
tees of "accuracy and balance" in televising court proceedings. 40
These guarantees are necessary to effectuate the Constitution's
mandate for a free and open society that shall be well-informed of
the judicial process by appropriately formulated guidelines gov-
erning broadcast of court proceedings in any electronic medium.41
The Court advocates for an experimental procedure to permit
analysis of the best methods to protect all parties' rights when
court proceedings are televised.42
The Constitutional Court takes a similar approach to the Su-
preme Court. Certain rights receive disproportionate values.
Yet, the Constitutional Court expressly asserts that reconcilia-
tion of conflicting rights so as to harmonize each right with the
other is preferable to allowance of one right to trump others. In a
reconciliation method, all rights would coexist in equal propor-
tion with each other. Each right retains an equivalent place
value, but, the Constitutional Court asserts, some situations re-
quire disproportionate valuation of fundamental rights to effec-
tuate underlying constitutional doctrines.
Realization that harmonization of rights in all circumstances is
impossible leads the Constitutional Court to favor reconciliation
of rights, but refrain from dictating all cases require application
of this principle. The Court recognizes the frustration in grant-
ing all rights coequal status because in such a situation none of
the rights may receive full expression. Here, the Court differs
from its American brother who recognizes that all rights can not
be equal and determines to effectuate applicable rights in a man-
ner so that the total expression of those rights retains deference
to each right. In other words, the Constitutional Court tries to
reconcile competing rights in one sphere, while the Supreme
Court seeks to harmonize rights contained in different spheres in
a common overlapping area. Within the overlapping area, rights
39 Id. at 68, 69 (explaining the preference for live broadcasts).
40 Id. at 69.
41 Id. at 70 (indicating television and radio are not necessarily the best mediums to in-
form citizens about judicial proceedings).
42 Id. at 72 (arguing that there should not be hastily improvised procedures).
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harmoniously coexist, but one right may occupy a disproportion-
ately larger part of the overlapping area then other rights.
B. Bartnicki v. Vopper compared with Soobramoney
Another comparison helps to elaborate the present discussion.
The two analyzed opinions cope with private individual rights.
The American case deals with the right to privacy and freedom of
the press, while the South African matter addresses the right to
life and access to emergency medical treatment. These two cases
reflect on the intrusion of the state upon individual conduct
whether by permitting publication of private conversations or
denying access to medical facilities for life-sustaining treatment.
i. Bartnicki v. Vopper
The Supreme Court addressed the conflict between the free-
dom of the press to publish overheard private conversations and
citizens' right to privacy. 43 The published conversations occurred
between two negotiators concerning the subject matter of a pend-
ing collective-bargaining agreement between the school teachers'
union and the school board.44 The negotiators proposed a strike
and drastic action involving destruction of school board members'
homes. 45 These statements were made over a cellular telephone
and intercepted by a third-party who disseminated the recorded
conversation, which ultimately lead to the broadcast of the con-
versation over the radio, television, and publication in local
newspapers. 46
The Court tackled the clash between the right of the press and
the individual's right to privacy.47 The Court sought to resolve
the question .'[w]here the . . .publisher of information has ob-
43 See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 518 (2001) ("[T]hese cases present a conflict
between interests of the highest order-on the one hand, the interest in the full and free
dissemination of information concerning public issues, and, on the other hand, the inter-
est in individual privacy and, more specifically, in fostering private speech.").
44 Id. (discussing the issues between the Pennsylvania State Education Association and
the Wyoming West Valley School Board).
45 Id. at 518-19 (Petitioner stated: "If they're not gonna move for three percent, we're
gonna have to go to their, their homes ... [t]o blow off their front porches, we'll have to do
some work on some of those guys.").
46 See id. at 519.
47 See Id. at 529.
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tained the information in question in a manner lawful in itself
but from a source who has obtained it unlawfully, may the gov-
ernment punish the ensuing publication of that information
based on the defect in a chain?"'48 The Court declined to address
the broader issue of "whether truthful publication may ever be
punished consistent with the First Amendment." 49
Examining the interests protected by criminalizing third party
interception of private conversations, the Court addressed two
societal interests served by the law: "first, the interest in remov-
ing an incentive for parties to intercept private conversations,
and second, the interest in minimizing the harm to persons
whose conversations have been illegally intercepted."50  The
Court determined criminally punishing publishers of private
statements who procured such statements far removed from the
initial illegal interception and whose publication of private
statements served the general public interest did not effectuate
the above societal interests.51
A third justification for punishing the publishers of private
communication, the chilling effect on private discourse public
dissemination of private conversations would have, did not sub-
stantiate criminal punishment in the Court's determination. 52
Despite the fear of publication of private conversation, the Court
opined that the public importance of such matters may rise to a
level that causes the right to privacy to give way when balanced
against the public interest in dissemination of truthful informa-
tion of public concern. 53 Therefore, a stranger's illegal intercep-
tion of a private conversation, while invading an individual's
48 Id. at 528 (quoting Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d 463, 484-85 (C.A.D.C. 1999)
(Sentelle, J., dissenting). On criminalizing speech generally in American jurisprudence,
see Susan W. Brenner, Complicit Publication: When Should the Dissemination of Ideas
and Data Be Criminalized?, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 273, 285-335 (2003).
49 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 529. This question arose initially in New York Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), reserved in Landmark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Va., 435 U.S.
829, 837 (1978), and reiterated in Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 535, n.8 (1989). See
generally KEITH WERHAN, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION (2004) (describing history of free speech in America as well as evo-
lution of various doctrinal legal concepts on first amendment jurisprudence).
50 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 529.
51 See id. at 529. The Court went further and stated "it would be quite remarkable to
hold that speech by a law-abiding possessor of information can be suppressed in order to
deter conduct by a non-law-abiding third party." See id. at 529-30.
52 See id. at 533.
53 See id. at 533-34.
[Vol. 22:3
CONFLICTS BETWEEN FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
right to privacy, does not trump the freedom and right of the
press to publicize such private speech about a matter of public
concern.
54
Here, the Supreme Court reaffirms a paradigm of proscribed
values for certain rights, which it employed in Estes. The Court
finds a greater inherent value to the right of freedom of the press
than to the right of privacy.5 5 Modifying the formula used in Es-
tes, the Court asserts that if the inherent value of one right is
less than another right's value, then the greater valued right re-
tains priority.
The Supreme Court's decision reiterates that all rights require
effective application in a given factual scenario. Yet, the Court
rejects the goal of harmonizing competing rights in favor of a
proscribed dominant right that overshadows other similarly situ-
ated rights. The terminology changes from reconciliation to com-
petition between rights. A clear winner permits consistent appli-
cation and anticipation of the right most valued. Predictability is
favored over the uncertainty of constantly evaluating which right
receives priority or greater value as the facts change. 56 This ap-
proach approximates the South African Constitutional Court's
formulation in South African Broadcasting Corp. Ltd. absent the
decree to attempt to harmonize conflicting rights rather than
have one right trump all other rights.
The Supreme Court modifies Estes by announcing a firm rule
that rights contain measurable inherent value. When rights
clash, the Court looks at the inherent value of each right and
places the most valuable right above all other rights.
51 Id. at 535. In the words of one of the Justices describing the ruling in the case subse-
quent to its decision, "when an ill-gotten communication touches on matters of public con-
cern, and the party making the disclosure played no part in the illegal interception, we
held, the First Amendment shields the disclosing party from liability." Judicial Confer-
ence of the Second Judicial Circuit of the United States, 225 F.R.D. 269, 345 (2001) (re-
marks of Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg).
55 Cf. Eric B. Easton, Public Importance: Balancing Proprietary Interests and the Right
to Know, 21 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 139, 167-75 (2003) (analyzing case and suggesting
Court decided one right to trump all others).
56 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1879)
(advocating "bad man" perspective of law to ensure predictability of punishments or re-
wards law ascribes to particular conduct).
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ii. Soobramoney
In 1997, the South African Constitutional Court decided the
fate of a dying forty-one year old man who had suffered a stroke
in 1996 and entered the final stages of chronic renal failure.5 7 His
life could be prolonged with the assistance of regular kidney di-
alysis treatment, which he sought at a state hospital in 1996.58
The hospital possessed twenty working dialysis machines, but
the hospital lacked the economic resources and staff to treat all
patients seeking treatment for chronic renal failure.59 As a result
of this lack of financial and human resources, the hospital estab-
lished an evaluative policy to select those patients who would
most benefit from dialysis treatment. 60 The policy automatically
admitted those patients whose renal failure could be completely
cured by the dialysis treatment. 61 All other patients were subject
to a secondary screening process that applied a set of guidelines
developed by the hospital to determine a patient's eligibility for
admission to dialysis treatment. 62
The primary evaluative guideline under the secondary screen-
ing was the patient's freedom from the chronic illnesses of is-
chametic heart and cerebro-vascular disease to successfully un-
dergo a kidney transplant.63 Mr. Soobramoney suffered from both
chronic diseases, and therefore proved ineligible under the hospi-
tal guidelines for admission to dialysis treatment; thus, he
sought and gained admission to a private hospital for dialysis.64
Yet in 1997, due to his lack of employment and exhaustion of his
finances, he lost access to this private, non-state treatment and
sought a court order to compel the state hospital to admit him for
dialysis treatment based upon his constitutional rights to emer-
gency medical treatment and to life.65
The Constitutional Court, in addressing Mr. Soobramoney's
constitutional claims, stressed that the South African Constitu-
57 Soobramoney v. Minister of Health, 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC).
58 Soobramoney, 1997 (12) BCLR T 1.
59 See id. at 99 1-3.
60 See id. at 3. The hospital sought additional state funds to augment its lack of staff
and additional dialysis machines, but was told by the state that no additional funds were
available. See id. at 2.
61 See id. at 3.
62 See Soobramoney at TT 3-4.
63 See id. at 1.
64 Soobramoney, 1997 (12) BCLR 99 1, 5.
65 See id. at 99 5-7 (citing S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 27(3), (11)).
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tion is a transformative foundational document, which aspires to
secure a new social condition for all South Africans. 66 Therefore,
the rights to emergency medical care and to life are dependant
upon the resources available and are limited by the lack of avail-
ability of such resources. 67 Within the context of limited re-
sources, an individual's constitutional rights must be evaluated. 68
The constitutional right to life must be construed according to
certain positive obligations imposed upon the state by such a
right.69 The right to life within the Constitution acquires mean-
ing through examination of the history surrounding the adoption
of the South African Constitution, other relevant constitutional
clauses, and the Constitution's Bill of Rights as a whole. 70 To-
gether, this interpretative construct is called the purposive ap-
proach. 71 Through this purposive approach, a generous interpre-
tation of the right occurs so as to ensure full protection of the
right, while recognizing that the context of limited resources may
require circumscription of the right through a narrow and spe-
cific articulation of the right's interpretation. 72
The definition of the constitutional provision prohibiting denial
of emergency medical treatment is its ordinary meaning and is
determinative of the extent of the right within the context of lim-
ited resources. 73 Emergency treatment is medical treatment re-
66 See id. at 9 (citing S. AFR. CONST. preamble). See Sandra Liebenberg, Socio-
Economic Rights, CONST. L. S. AFR. 33-1, 33-9 (2003) (asserting significant link between
socio-economic rights and fundamental constitutional precepts affirms central transfor-
mative purpose of Constitution to address inequities).
67 Soobramoney, 1997 (12) BCLR 11.
68 Id. (stating that the "rights themselves are limited by reason of the lack of re-
sources."). But see Darrel Moellendorf, Reasoning About Resources: Soobramoney and the
Future of Socio-Economic Rights Claims, 14 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 327, 330-31 (1998) (not-
ing amorphous definition of available rights, in failure of Court to grant same status to
socio-economic rights as civil rights, and in granting undue weight to constrictions within
present budgetary system).
69 Soobramoney, 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC) 15 (S. Ar.) (concluding that the South Af-
rican Bill of Rights imposes positive obligations on the state).
70 Id. at 16.
71 See id. at 16 (announcing that the purposive approach has been adopted by the
court); see also Craig Scott & Philip Alston, Adjudicating Constitutional Priorities in a
Transnational Context: A Comment on Soobramoney's Legacy and Grootboom's Promise,
16 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 206, 235 (2000) (announcing the acceptance of applying the pur-
posive approach for interpreting the Bill of Rights).
72 Soobramoney, 1997 (12) BCLR 17 (citing the "generous interpretation to be given to
a right to ensure that individuals secure the full protection of the Bill of Rights").
73 See id. at 13 (explaining that "emergency medical treatment" is within the scope of
coverage by the Constitution).
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quired because of a sudden unanticipated urgency.7 4 Such treat-
ment may not constitutionally be denied in this circumstance. 75
Therefore, the Constitution only requires, because the right is
explicitly in negative terms, that an individual be given medical
treatment when a sudden catastrophic immediate need for reme-
dial treatment is necessary to avert an immediate harm to the
individual.7 6
The Court next considered Mr. Soobramoney's situation in
light of the facts and purposive approach to interpreting the Con-
stitution, and found that the hospital implemented evaluative
guidelines that selected patients who would benefit the most
from dialysis treatment, i.e. those patients whose renal failure
would be cured by dialysis.77 The Court found the hospital's
guidelines rational, taken in good faith, and promulgated by the
medical authorities whose responsibility it is to generate such
policies that affect the utilization of scarce medical resources.
Therefore the Court would not interfere with such determina-
tions. 78
The Court opined that the medical authorities determined
utilization of scarce dialysis machinery by patients like Mr. Soo-
bramoney, whose life may only be prolonged, detrimentally lim-
ited access to treatment by patients who could be cured by such
treatment. 79 Hence, the purposive approach renders interpreta-
tions of the right to emergency medical treatment and to life that
74 See id. at 18 (describing emergency medical treatment as being sudden and urgent,
without an opportunity to make other arrangements).
75 See id. (citing Article 21 of the South African Constitution, which affirms the duty of
state-run hospitals to extend medical assistance for the preservation of human life).
76 See id. at 19 (positing that providing resources to "everyone" would deplete state re-
sources for preventative care and curable illnesses); see also Scott & Alston, supra note
71, at 236 (noting the duties of the state not to refuse services "which are available" and
not to turn a person away from a hospital "which is able" to provide necessary treatment).
77 See Soobramoney, 1997 (12) BCLR 25 (finding the current hospital program to be
rational, as it maximized the favorable outcome of treatment); see also Richard J. Gold-
stone, A South African Perspective on Social and Economic Rights, 13 HuM. RTS. BRIEF 4,
5 (2006) (noting that Richard Goldstone recently retired as a Justice of the South African
Constitutional Court).
78 See Soobramoney, 1997 (12) BCLR 99 29-30 (citing English case law in support of
this rule); see also Goldstone, supra note 77, at 5 (asserting the Court decided Soo-
bramoney's situation was not an emergency; therefore, the Court lacked authority to or-
der hospitals to acquire more dialysis machines).
19 See Soobramoney, 1997 (12) BCLR 26, 28 (postulating that if hospitals were re-
quired to treat all patients suffering from chronic renal failure, the hospital's "carefully
tailored programme would collapse").
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are inconsistent with Mr. Soobramoney's contended definition of
these rights.80 The Court's interpretation of these rights allows
full effect to be given to each of these rights while honoring these
rights in relation to the overall constitutional text.8 '
The Soobramoney decision articulates a rational decision ap-
proach to interpretation of conflicting rights.8 2 The opinion is
pragmatic and practical, acutely focusing on the exercise of rights
within the reality present before the Court.8 3 The approach flows
from a plain language interpretation of constitutional text cou-
pled with an originalist conception of reading constitutional
mandates within the historical context that bore them. Rights,
whether fundamental or constitutional, are effective only to the
extent their language is achievable. In this sense, there is no
conflict between rights in the decision, but the absence of an abil-
ity to achieve the rights set down in the Constitution. The
Court's formulation conveys the notion that scarce resources jus-
tify the result that an individual's right to life may not be pre-
served. The equation is supplemented with an analogous formu-
lation that an individual's right to emergency medical treatment
does not extend to a chronic condition not yet causing the indi-
vidual death.
The South African approach differs greatly from the above Su-
preme Court's decision determining that rights possess inherent
values, which predictably determine the priority of conflicting
rights. Whereas the Constitutional Court determines textual
limitations require circumscription of rights, the Supreme Court
adheres to harmonizing the prioritized right with other rights to
achieve a harmonious solution. The South African Court faces
the problem of scarce resources as a limiting factor to total ex-
pression of constitutional rights whereas the Supreme Court con-
strues rights as totally vested as written, or valuable ab initio.
This interpretative difference contributes to the varying resolu-
tion of the conflicts between constitutional rights in these two ju-
risdictions.
- See id. at 36 (announcing that the state's failure to provide renal dialysis facilities
for all persons was not a violation of their constitutional rights).
81 See Soobramoney, 1997 (12) BCLR 36 (affirming the state's constitutional duty).
82 See Liebenberg, supra note 66, at 41-41, 41-42 (indicating that a "large degree of def-
erence would be accorded to budgetary priorities by provincial administration").
83 See Justice Albie Sachs, Social and Economic Rights: Can They Be Made Justiciable?,
53 SMU L. REV. 1381, 1385-86 (2000) (noting practicalities recognized in the decision).
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II. U.S. FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS CONFLICTING WITH
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL/STATUTORY RIGHTS AND SOUTH AFRICA'S
GROOTBOOM DECISION
Both cases analyzed in this Section deal with the fundamental
right to property and the right to be free from governmental in-
terference with the right. The United States case deals with the
ability of government to seize private property for economic de-
velopment, while the South African case addresses the utilization
of governmental processes to deprive individuals of property.
The underlying conflict in both cases is the right of government
versus the right of the individual. The stakes in the contest are
the basic norms free government is founded upon-the right to
own private property.8 4 The essentiality of this concept to liberal
democratic regimes necessitates comparison between the views of
an entrenched liberal democracy and those of a new democratic
regime born in the modern era. S5
A. Kelo v. New London
The United States Supreme Court assessed whether seizure of
private homes by the state pursuant to an approved economic de-
velopment plan and state statutory framework was constitu-
tional under the Fifth Amendment.8 6 The State of Connecticut,
84 See Eduardo M. Penalver, Property Metaphors and Kelo v. New London: Two Views
Of The Castle, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2971, 2975-76 (2006) (noting predominate American
conception of inviolability of private property by the state).
85 James Madison, The Papers of James Madison, in THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION ch.
16 (William T. Hutchinson et al. eds., 1962-77) (according to James Madison: "Govern-
ment is instituted to protect property of every sort; as well that which lies in the various
rights of individuals, as that which the term particularly expresses. This being the end of
government, that alone is a just government, which impartially secures to every man,
whatever is his own.") (emphasis in original).
86 See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[P]rivate property [shall not] be taken for public use,
without just compensation"); see also Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539
(2006) ("The Court has held that physical takings require compensation because of the
unique burden they impose: A permanent physical invasion, however minimal the eco-
nomic cost it entails, eviscerates the owner's right to exclude others from entering and
using her property-perhaps the most fundamental of all property interests."); see also
Kelo v. New London, 545 U.S. 469, 472-74, 476-78 (2005) (considering whether a city's
development plan to take property for a private purpose was constitutional); see also Chi-
cago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 240-42 (holding that the
government, because of the due process mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment, must
compensate the owner for private property that is taken for public use). See generally
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES (Aspen Pub., 2d
ed. 1997) (detailing general American constitutional law legal precepts).
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by statute, specifically authorized state taking of land for public
use and in the public interest pursuant to an economic develop-
ment plan.8 7 Prior precedent firmly held the taking of private
property by the state may not be for the purpose of "conferring a
private benefit on a particular private party" or "under the mere
pretext of a public purpose, when its actual purpose was to be-
stow a private benefit."88 Neither of these prohibitions covered
the case at bar.8 9 Indeed, after taking the land, the state planed
to convey large tracts of the property to private parties for pri-
vate use and development with no public right of access. 90 In sur-
veying the decisions on public purpose, the Supreme Court con-
cluded that its jurisprudence took into consideration the varying
needs of different states across the nation and the wide latitude
the federal government gave to the individual state legislatures
to determine the specific circumstances that justified taking pri-
vate property. 91 The Court found the taking of 115 private resi-
dences pursuant to an economic development plan to "unques-
tionably servef a public purpose," because economic rejuvenation
has been a function of government, is indistinguishable from
other recognized public purpose takings, and falls within the
broad interpretation of "public purpose" as articulated under
prior precedent. 92
The conflict of rights in this case is between the right of gov-
ernment to seize private property for just compensation and the
right of the individual citizen to be free from such intrusion,
unless circumstances absolutely necessitate seizure in the inter-
ests of the public good.93 The Court does not reach an absolute
equilibrium. The right of government slightly eclipses the indi-
vidual right, but the individual right receives great weight in en-
87 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 474-76 (upholding the taking of the appellant's property); see
also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN., art. 1, §11 (prohibiting state seizure of private property for
public use without just compensation); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-193 (2005) (author-
izing the acquisition of real property by eminent domain for a development plan).
38 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477 (quoting and citing Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467
U.S. 229, 245 (1984); Missouri Pacific R.R. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896)).
89 See id. (stating that the court found no violation of the principles of private property
takings in this case).
90 Id. at 2662.
91 Id. at 2664.
92 Id. at 2659, 2665.
93 See Matthew P. Harrington, "Public Use" And The Original Understanding Of The
So-Called "Takings" Clause, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1245, 1278-1301 (2002) (discussing the his-
torical rationales for this rule in America).
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suring just compensation. In a sense, the practicality of the Soo-
bramoney Court is reflected in the Supreme Court's decision in
the present case.94 The Court solves the conflict between rights
in deference to more democratic branches of government and re-
fuses to dictate, like the Soobramoney Court did with rationing of
dialysis treatment, to a better equipped governmental branch the
best method to achieve harmonization of rights. 95
The Court utilizes rubrics to frame the conflict of rights. The
Court refers to two distinct rubrics or established categories,
which jurisprudence dictates the private individual right is vio-
lated by the governmental right.96 These two instances are: when
the government exercises its right to seize property only to secure
benefit to a non-governmental entity, and when the government
seizes private land under the pretense of governmental interests,
which in reality secures benefits to non-governmental actors. 97 In
the Court's estimation, in these two circumstances the right of
the individual receives greater weight and is valued more than
the governmental right.98 When a case, such as the present one,
arises that falls outside of these rubrics, the Court reverts to a
harmonizing approach. 99 Harmony between the rights occurs by
the private right giving ground to the governmental right when
94 The Kelo decision was as unpopular as the Soobramoney decision. See Wendell E.
Pritchett, Beyond Kelo: Thinking About Urban Development in the 21st Century, 22 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 895, 905-06 (2006) (describing American legislative reactions); see also
Goldstone, supra note 77, at 5 (describing South African public reaction).
95 See Brody v. Village of Port Chester, 434 F.3d 121, 135 (2d Cir. 2005) ("The combina-
tion of those factors-the narrow scope of issues and the broad deference to the legisla-
ture-suggests that the role of the courts in enforcing the constitutional limitations on
eminent domain is one of patrolling the borders. That which falls within the boundaries of
acceptability is not subject to review.").
96 See Daniel B. Kelley, The "Public Use" Requirement in Eminent Domain Law: A Ra-
tionale Based on Secret Purchases and Private Influence, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 9-15
(2006) (detailing the history of evolution of rubrics in area of government seizing private
property for public use).
97 See Charles E. Cohen, Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City Of New London: An Argu-
ment for Banning Economic Development Takings, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 491, 504-
16 (2006) (presenting modern case law jurisprudence explicating two purposes prohibited
by Court for state to seize private property).
98 Christopher Serkin, Big Differences for Small Governments: Local Governments and
the Takings Clause, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1624, 1633-44 (2006) (highlighting fairness as the
fundamental purpose in Court's decisions, and the relevance of economic and public choice
theory for takings jurisprudence).
99 See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Uselessness of Public Use, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 1412 (2006) (describing criticisms of Kelo decision, illustrating alternate
governmental powers to take private property, and arguing correctness of Kelo outcome).
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the constitutional requirement of taking private property for a
solely public purpose occurs. 100 In the realm of taking property
for a public purpose, both rights exist in equality because each
right achieves its end or purpose.
This method of harmony may be described as the teleological
approach to conflicting rights. As long as the end or purpose of
each right is achieved, then both rights are effectuated. The end
of the governmental right is to only interfere with the private
right when approved by democratic processes as a public pur-
pose. The end of the private right is to ensure property's seizure
occurred pursuant to a public purpose and for just compensa-
tion. 10 1 Both ends, in the Court's opinion, were achieved. Of
course, the Court arrived at this result by the factual determina-
tion that taking private property pursuant to a plan for economic
development was historically a governmental function and al-
ways in the public interest.
The Court seeks, like Estes, to establish an area where rights
overlap. The difference between the present case and Estes is
that the Court permits rights to cede value to each other, but de-
nies loss of value to prevent rights achievement of their goal or
end. Rights coexist, but one right may not overvalue all other
rights to prevent such other rights' attainment of their end.
B. Grootboom
Given the appalling living conditions Ms. Grootboom and sev-
eral others were subject to, they moved out of their existing
dwellings and onto private land.10 2 Soon after moving onto pri-
vate land, while Ms. Grootboom awaited placement in govern-
ment sponsored low cost housing, the landholder evicted Ms.
Grootboom, leaving her homeless. 10 3 The private land that Ms.
100 See Daniel A. Farber, Another View of the Quagmire: Unconstitutional Conditions
and Contract Theory, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 913 (2006) (arguing constitutional rights are
exchanged by citizens with government to receive benefits).
101 As a Justice of the Supreme Court recently asserted, "a purely literal reading of the
Takings Clause would limit its coverage to a guarantee of just compensation. We have
nevertheless assumed that the reference to 'public use' does describe an implicit limit on
the power to condemn private property, but over the years we have frequently and consis-
tently read those words broadly to refer to a 'public purpose."' John Paul Stevens, Learn-
ing on the Job, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1561, 1566-67 (2006).
102 Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) 3.
103 Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 3.
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Grootboom occupied was earmarked for low cost housing by the
government, but such housing was yet to be constructed. 10 4 Ms.
Grootboom waited in a queue for seven years for her placement
in low-cost housing. 10 5 Her eviction from the private land oc-
curred in 1997, but she had nowhere else to go, and the eviction
was not perfected until 1999, when a bulldozer and firebrands
removed her from the land.10 6 Still without any other place to
live, she took herself and her child to a nearby sports field and
erected a makeshift shelter.107
Ms. Grootboom and others similarly affected asserted these ac-
tions violated their constitutional rights contained in Section 26
of the Constitution to adequate housing, and freedom from arbi-
trary eviction, as well as their children's rights to basic nutrition,
shelter, healthcare and social services contained in Section 28 of
the Constitution. 08 The Constitutional Court noted the Constitu-
tion's preamble is a distant dream and the government's failure
to fulfill the commitments enshrined in the Constitution creates
a popular perception that law fails to protect the individual with
resort to extra-legal justice the only viable option to enforce
rights. 10 9 The Court, therefore asserted, constitutional rights,
rather than mere paper epithets, must be enforceable. °10
The Court reiterated Soobramoney's purposive approach to in-
terpret constitutional rights within the proper historical and tex-
tual context. 1 ' South Africa's housing problem, when viewed in
historical context, requires effectuation of the rights to adequate
housing and the enactment of reasonable measures to progres-
sively realize adequate housing for all South Africans through a
104 Id. at 4.
105 Id. at 8.
106 Id. at 9, 10.
107 Id. at 11.
108 Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 19. This asserts a violation of S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, §§
26, 28. Section 26 reads: "(1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing.
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right. (3) No one may be evicted
from their home, or have their home demolished, without an order of court made after
considering all the relevant circumstances. No legislation may permit arbitrary evictions."
S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, §26. Section 28 reads: "(1) Every child has the right ... (c) to basic
nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social services." S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, §
28(1)(c).
109 Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1-2.
110 Id. at 20.
1I Id. at 19, 26.
[Vol. 22:3
CONFLICTS BETWEENFUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
socially inclusive program that responds to the changing needs of
the nation's citizens concerning housing. 112 The context of these
rights within the Bill of Rights requires the state to formulate
legislation and executive policies so as not to simply effect a sta-
tistical advance in realization of these rights.113 Proper enforce-
ment of constitutional rights requires case-by-case determination
as facts and circumstances impact the Court's evaluation of
rights within context. 114
Textually, the Court asserted constitutional rights contained
within the Bill of Rights Section of the Constitution are interre-
lated and mutually supportive.11 5 Particularly, the rights articu-
lated in Section 26(1) and 26(2) (adequate housing and progres-
sive realization) of the Constitution are related and must
therefore be read in conjunction with each other. 116 The rights ar-
ticulated in Section 26 read together imply an unwritten negative
right of government not to impair access to adequate housing by
citizens. 11 7 The state bears the obligation to the citizenry to rea-
sonably formulate and implement the rights articulated in Sec-
tions 26(1) and 26(2) with particular regard to human dignity as
articulated in the Constitution's preamble.118
Section 26(1) defines the scope of the right to adequate hous-
ing. 119 The right to such housing belongs to all people-including
children.1 20 The right to adequate housing encompasses more
than just a physical house-it includes access to land to build a
home upon and all the services associated with obtaining owner-
ship of a house.1 21 Hence, the state bears an obligation to provide
and create the necessary conditions for all citizens to access hous-
112 Id. at 43; S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, §§ 26(1), 26(2).
113 See Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) 44.
114 See id. at 20.
115See id. at 23. See also Liebenberg, supra note 66, at 33-10 (indicating Court holds
interconnectedness of rights impacts determination of fulfillment of rights while not di-
minishing necessity for individual compliance assessment).
116 See Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) 34.
117 See id. (noting the right to be free from arbitrary eviction) (S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, §
26(3)).
11 See id. at 42, 83. See Liebenberg, supra note 65, at 33-33, 33-35.
119 S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 26(1). As shown by the words "access to adequate housing."
120 See id. This is indicated by the word "[e]veryone" which starts this Section. See also
Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) 74.
121 See Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) 35.
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ing that accounts for the economic conditions of individual citi-
zens.
122
The right to adequate housing is therefore qualified by the eco-
nomic condition of the citizen asserting the right. 123 Thus, when
the citizen possesses enough money to purchase housing, the
state must provide the citizen access to financing and necessary
physical materials pursuant to a legislative framework. 124 Simi-
larly, when the citizen cannot afford housing, the state must in-
stitute social development programs to provide housing through
legislation. 125 The scope of the right to adequate housing fluctu-
ates according to the factual economic condition of the citizen
seeking to assert the right.126
Section 26(2) is a positive obligation upon to the state to re-
frain from arbitrary conduct, but such an obligation is not an un-
qualified or absolute obligation. 127 The obligation is one that re-
quires reasonable progress by the state. 128 Reasonable progress is
the allocation by the state of responsibilities and tasks to na-
tional and provincial governments supported by appropriate
available financial and human resources. 129 Hence, the right to
adequate housing requires the state to promulgate a coherent
public housing program that provides access to housing progres-
sively through means available to the state.130 Implementation of
such a program occurs through legislation, well directed policies,
and programs enforced by the executive branch of government. 131
Having declared the above constitutional principles, the Court
discussed the Housing Act, legislation enacted to address Ms.
Grootboom's situation, and found the Act does not provide for fa-
cilitated access to temporary relief for citizens who have no ac-
cess to land or shelter.132 The Court determined legislation that
122 See id.
123 See id. at 7 36 (describing between the government's job in regards to those who can
afford to pay for some housing and those who cannot afford it at all).
124 See id. ("For those who can afford to pay for adequate housing, the state's primary
obligations lies in unlocking the system providing access to housing stock and a legislative
framework to facilitate self-built houses through planning law and access to finance.").
125 See id.
126 See id. at 37.
127 See id. at 38.
128 See id. at 7 39.
129 See id.
130 See id. at 41.
131 See id. at 42.
132 See id. at 77 47, 52, 63.
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omitted provisions for citizens of the type described above re-
sulted in a failure by the state to act reasonably.13 3 Therefore,
both the national and provincial governments breached Section
26(2) of the Constitution because legislation and executive poli-
cies failed to reasonably address the needs of a class of citizens in
need of emergency housing and those citizens in need of relief.13 4
The Court determined that the state must devise, implement,
and fund measures to reasonably accommodate these affected
citizens. 135
The Court then turned to the children's assertion, similar to
the adult citizens, that their constitutional rights were violated
by lacking access to land or shelter. The Court determined the
rights to adequate housing and progressive realization contained
in Sections 26(1) and 26(2) overlap with children's rights to basic
nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social services
guaranteed by Section 28(1)(c). 13 6 Utilizing the purposive ap-
proach, the Court found the rights articulated in Sections 28(1)(c)
and 28(1)(b) delineate the scope of care a child should receive in
South Africa. 37 The Court reasoned that the scope of responsible
care is defined in Section 28(1)(b), while the aspects of that care
is confined to Section 28(1)(c).138
Therefore, the Court opined, care of children falls initially to
parents or family thereby circumscribing the rights contained in
28(1)(c) and 28(1)(b). 139 The parents and family bear initial re-
133 See id. at 69, 74.
134 See id. at 7 96, 99.
135 See id. at 7 96. Another scholar indicates that the remedy, legislative action, pro-
vides a new type of enforcement mechanism for courts to utilize rather than order imme-
diate remediation of the situation before the court. Mark Tushnet, How (And How Not) to
Use Comparative Constitutional Law in Basic Constitutional Law Courses, 49 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 671, 681-82 (2005). Additionally, the Court found the state failed to effectuate hu-
mane evictions, which the state bears an obligation to ensure humane evictions under
Section 26 of the Constitution. Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR. 88.
136 See id. at 74. The context of the children's right to basic nutrition, shelter, basic
health care services and social services includes the United Nations Convention on Rights
of the Child. See id. at 75; Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. res. 44/25, annex,
44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 167, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989), entered into force Sept. 2,
1990.
137 See Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 76. The applicable Section of the Constitution
reads, "[elvery child has the right ... (b) to family care or parental care, or to appropriate
alternative care when removed from the family environment." S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, §
28(1)(b).
138 See Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 76.
139 See id. at T 77.
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sponsibility to provide children with shelter.140 Yet, when the
parents or family is absent, then the state bears responsibility to
assure the 28(1)(c) and 28(1)(b) rights to the child.141 Thus, the
constitutional right to housing asserted by a child is not a right
the state bears primary responsibility for securing. 142 When chil-
dren receive care from parents or family the state must provide
legal and administrative structures to protect children from
abuse by parents or family. 143 These necessary legal and admin-
istrative structures do not include state provision of housing to
children's parents, i.e. children do not possess an independent
right separate from their parents or family to demand adequate
housing. 144 The Court further concluded that neither Section 28
nor Section 26 entitle citizens to immediate housing upon de-
mand. 145
The Court adheres to the purposive approach to determine how
rights interact with each other. This test focuses on the meaning
of rights within context. Reasonability is the standard elected by
the Court to determine whether the government has complied
with the rights articulated.1 46 In this case, the first conflict be-
tween rights occurs in the text of the South African Constitution.
The right to adequate housing sits in the first subsection of Sec-
tion 26, while the right to have the state undertake reasonable
measures to progressively realize adequate housing for South Af-
ricans within available means resides in the second subsection of
Section 26.147 These two rights conflict within the Constitution's
140 See id.
141 Id. But cf. Elsie Bonthuys, The Best Interests of Children In The South African Con-
stitution, 20 INT'L J.L. & POL'Y & FAM. 23, 34 (2006) (noting reluctance of Court to utilize
best interests of child, a constitutional concept, to secure parents rights).
142 See Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 77.
143 See id. at 78.
144 See id. at 79.
145 See id. at 95.
146 The reasonableness policy review of the Court has been described as "a model of
means-end review, within which the standard of scrutiny is reasonableness, which claims
to concern itself not with relative wisdom of different policy choices, but 'simply' with its
reasonableness." Danie Brand, The Proceduralisation Of South African Socio-Economic-
Rights Jurisprudence, Or 'What Are Socio-Economic Rights For?, in RIGHTS AND
DEMOCRACY IN A TRANSFORMATIVE CONSTITUTION 33, 43 (Henk Botha, et al. eds., 2003).
147 The predominate focus on legislative measures is confirmed by another Justice who
asserted the Housing Act "failed to meet the obligation imposed on the state by the Con-
stitution because it excluded from its scope a significant segment of society in need of ac-
cess to shelter. This was not reasonable." Arthur Chaskalson, From Wickedness to Equal-
ity: The Moral Transformation of South African Law, 1 INT'L J. CONST. L. 590, 603 (2003).
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text because the first right to adequate housing appears unen-
cumbered by the limiting language contained within the immedi-
ately following subsection describing the progressive realization
of adequate housing to all South Africans. 148 The right to ade-
quate housing appears in the text as an affirmative obligation
upon the state to ensure citizens receive adequate housing.149
The right to progressive realization through reasonable legisla-
tive measures of adequate housing is a limited constrained right
creating only a state obligation to enact legislation when the eco-
nomic and physical means are available.
In resolving these conflicted rights, the Court mandates read-
ing the two subsections because of their textually proximity as
interrelated and mutually supportive. 150 By this judicial gloss,
the Court solves the inherent conflict between these two rights
and establishes one right to adequate housing through progres-
sive realization accomplished by reasonable legislative measures
and available resources.' 51 This approach starkly differs from
Kelo where the Supreme Court sought to ensure each right
A Justice of the Constitutional Court asserted "the key issue before the Court was
whether the government was in breach of its Section 26(2) rights to provide housing to the
applicants. The Court held that Section 26(2) ... encapsulates the positive obligation im-
posed upon the state in respect of the right to housing. The court considered the three key
components of this obligation to be the duty to take 'reasonable legislative and other
measures,' 'within available resources,' and 'to achieve the progressive realisation of the
right."' Kate O'Regan, Human Rights and Democracy-A New Global Debate: Reflections
on the First Ten Years of South Africa's Constitutional Court, 32 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 200,
214 (2004).
148 See Jeanne M. Woods, Justiciable Social Rights as a Critique of the Liberal Para-
digm, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 763, 786 (2003) (noting "the novel task of discovering the norma-
tive content of a constitutional right that is subject to the unusual condition of resource
availability").
149 See Gerhard Erasmus, Socio-Economic Rights And Their Implementation: The Im-
pact of Domestic and International Instruments, 32 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 243, 248 (2004)
(noting Court held violation of negative obligation of Section 26 rights and also analyzed
positive obligations placed upon state by Section 26).
150 This may also result from a legal cultural phenomena declaring "the role of a judge
is not transformative, that judges are there simply to implement the law. With that as the
overarching view of the place of judges in the system goes a particular conception of adju-
dication: making assessments on the claims of equally equipped parties in a neutral and
noninterventionist manner." Anashri Pillay, Assessing Justice in South Africa, 17 FLA. J.
INT'LL. 463, 470-71, 474-75 (2005).
151 See Lynn Berat, The Constitutional Court of South Africa and Jurisdictional Ques-
tions in the Interests of Justice?, 3 INT'L J. CONST. L. 39, 67 (2005) (noting "Court made no
effort to articulate what would constitute acceptable evidence of the government's ade-
quate attention to a particular group or situation, and made no attempt even to establish
minimum criteria for defining the right").
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achieved its end. The Grootboom court diminishes one right by
subsuming the other right within the primary right. 152 Where
Kelo sought to preserve the spheres of both rights to achieve
harmony between the rights, Grootboom permits substantial al-
teration of one right to accommodate another right. In other
words, Kelo reconciles the individual right with the governmental
right by harmonizing each right and ensuring both rights accom-
plished their intended end. Grootboom, on the other hand, amal-
gamates the individual right to housing and the governmental
right to progressively provide adequate housing to citizens creat-
ing a solitary right where two rights previously existed.
While creating a solitary right to adequate housing, the Court
also determined both children and adults possess this same right.
The Court, however, explicates that the child's right to adequate
housing is not equivalent to an adult's right. Children enjoy a
qualified right to adequate housing dependant upon whether
they possess parents or family to care for them. Only in the ab-
sence of family or parents may a child exercise his right to ade-
quate housing like an adult. Here, another conflict is found be-
tween a child's and adult's right to adequate housing. The Court
solves this conflict by qualifying the child's right so that his right
is effectuated through his parents or family when possible. In
absence of family or parents, the Court rationalizes that the child
may assert his individual right to adequate housing provided to
him through reasonable governmental measures.
Grootboom's qualification of the children's right to adequate
housing reflects Kelo's desire to permit each right to achieve its
end. Grootboom allows the child to secure adequate housing
through his parents ensuring the end of his right. Grootboom
seeks to harmonize the conflicting rights, as Kelo did, while re-
taining each right's end or goal in regards to the conflict of rights
to adequate housing between adults and children. Hence, the
Grootboom court employs a similar teleological method, as did
the Kelo court to solve a subsidiary conflict between rights.
152 Explaining this phenomenon, the rights adjudicated are "weak rights" because "Con-
stitutional provisions allowing governments to adopt reasonable programs to achieve so-
cial welfare rights, a willingness to find some programs unreasonable, and a remedial sys-
tem that does not guarantee that any particular plaintiff will receive individualized
relief." Mark Tushnet, Social Welfare Rights and the Forms of Judicial Review, 82 TEX. L.
REV. 1895, 1906 (2004).
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III. U.S. FEDERAL RIGHTS AND SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS CONFLICTING WITH INTERNATIONAL TREATY RIGHTS
The final American typology is the treatment of international
legal rights, which conflict with constitutional rights. 15 3 Three re-
cent Supreme Court decisions articulate varying approaches to
resolving or mitigating conflicts between rights prescribed by the
Constitution and rights created by international treaty. The ap-
proaches taken in these cases are compared to the South African
Constitutional Court's treatment of similar conflicts. Analysis of
both courts' decisions underlies the increasing interaction be-
tween domestic constitutional norms and international treaty
rights.
A. U.S. v. Alvarez-Machain (Extradition Treaty between the U.S.
and Mexico) Compared to South African Jurisprudence
i. U.S. v. Alvarez-Machain
Dr. Alvarez-Machain, a Mexican national, was abducted from
Mexico by American procured agents and brought to the U.S. for
criminal prosecution concerning Alvarez-Machain's involvement
in torturing a federal American narcotics agent.' 54 Dr. Alvarez-
Machain sought to dismiss all criminal charges levied against
him in the United States on the basis that his abduction from
Mexico constituted a violation of the United States-Mexico Ex-
tradition Treaty.155 To determine whether Alvarez-Machain's
criminal charges should be dropped, the United States Supreme
Court turned to a similar case decided almost a century ear-
lier.156
153 Cf. YING-JEN Lo, HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION PROMOTING INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
U.S. COURTS (2005) (discussing various lower federal court opinions in which interna-
tional law was discussed and asserted as basis for cause of action as well as describing
U.S. federal courts reaction and interpretation of such international law).
154 U.S. v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 657 (1992).
155 Id. at 658. See Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, [1979]; United States-United Mexi-
can States, 31 U.S.T. 5059, T.I.A.S. No. 9656.
156 Alvarez, 504 U.S. at 660-63 (analyzing the Supreme Court's opinion in Ker v. Illi-
nois).
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In Ker v. Illinois,157 the Supreme Court considered whether an
American citizen, charged with certain crimes in the United
States, could have such charges dismissed because he was forci-
bly kidnapped from Peru in violation of an extradition treaty be-
tween the United States and Peru.158 Ker, the abductee, con-
tended that his kidnapping violated due process secured to him
through the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution.159 The Court found no violation of due process because,
absent the irregularities of his abduction and violation of Ameri-
can domestic law, Ker could have been validly arrested within
American territory. 60
His due process claim failing, Ker asserted that the extradition
treaty created a right exercisable by him to contest his removal
from Peru "in the courts of the United States in all cases,
whether the removal took place under proceedings sanctioned by
the treaty, or under proceedings which were in total disregard of
that treaty, amounting to an unlawful and unauthorized kidnap-
ping."'161 Ker founded this right in a right of asylum acquired by
his flight from America and arrival in Peru, but the Court found
no support in the language of the United States-Peru Extradi-
tion Treaty or any other extradition treaty then existent in the
world that granted a criminal fleeing prosecution from his nation
the right of asylum. 162 The Court found that Ker was not brought
157 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
158 Id. at 438-39 (describing the defendant's abduction from Peru and subsequent trans-
port to the United States against his will in order to face charges in Illinois).
159 Id. at 439-40 (positing that the defendant alleged that his abduction and extradition
deprived him of due process, presumably that of the Fourteenth Amendment since he
faced charges in the state of Illinois).
160 Id. at 440 (stating that once the defendant was within the territory of Illinois, noth-
ing in the way he was treated constituted a violation of due process).
161 Id. at 441.
162 The Court reasoned "it is idle, therefore, to claim that, either by express terms or by
implication, there is given to a fugitive from justice in one of these countries any right to
remain and reside in the other; and, if the right of asylum means anything, it must mean
this." Id. at 442. This conclusion, made in 1886, is refuted in current international trea-
ties and domestic jurisprudence governing the right of asylum. See e.g., Convention Re-
lating to the Status of Refugees, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, entered into force April 22, 1954, avail-
able at http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/refugees.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2007); Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, entered into force Oct. 4, 1967,
available at http://www.unhchr.chthtml/menu3fb/o_p_ref.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2007);
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Pun-
ishment, G.A. res. 39/46, annex, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51
(1984), entered into force June 26, 1987, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3
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into the United States under the extradition treaty and therefore
he possessed no enforceable rights under that treaty whose pro-
visions were not relied upon in brining Ker to American soil.163
The Court, then decided,
[tihe question of how far his forcible seizure in another coun-
try, and transfer by violence, force, or fraud to this country,
could be made available to resist trial in the state court for
the offense now charged upon him, is one which we do not
feel called upon to decide; for in that transaction we do not
see that the constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States guaranty him any protection. 164
Ker, 119 U.S. at 444
Upon this jurisprudential precedent, the current Supreme
Court evaluated Alvarez-Machain's claimed treaty right. The Al-
varez-Machain Court turned to the terms of the treaty relied
upon to create an enforceable right necessitating dismissal of all
criminal charges. 65 Initially, the Court noted the absence of any
language in the treaty mandating that either signatory to the
treaty refrain from forcibly abducting individuals present in ei-
ther contracting party's territory. 66 Further, the Court noted
/b/hcat39.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2007); European Convention for the Prevention of Tor-
ture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, E.T.S. 126, entered into force
Feb. 1, 1989, available at http://www.cpt.coe.int/EN/documents/ecpt.htm (last visited Nov.
4, 2007); See Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
G.A. res. 428 (V), annex, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 46, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950),
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/htmllmenu3/b/ounhcr.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2007);
Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, Nov. 22, 1984, Annual Report of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, OAS Doc. OEAISer.LJV/II.66/doc.10, rev. 1, at 190-93
(1984-85), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/cartagena1984.html (last
visited Nov. 4, 2007); UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining
Refugee Status Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status
of Refugees, U.N. Doc. HCRIIP/4/Eng/REV. 1 (1992), available at http://www.unhcr.org
/homeJPUBL/3d58e13b4.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 2007).
163 Ker, 119 U.S. at 443 (positing that the act of transferring Ker from Peru to the
United States was not done under the authority of the treaty).
164 The Alvarez-Machain Court noted Ker was decided "on the premise that there was
no governmental involvement in the abduction . . . and Peru, from which Ker was ab-
ducted, did not object to his prosecution." Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 662.
165 Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 669 (noting that the language of the treaty did not in-
dicate that the abduction of the defendant was a violation that warranted dismissal of
criminal charges in the United States, and therefore that his abduction did not prevent
his trial in the United States for crimes committed in the United States).
166 Id. at 662 (positing that there is no express promise in the treaty by either party to
refrain from forcible abductions in the territory of the other nation).
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that the treaty's own language did not define any specific manner
in which either party must effect extradition. 167 The Court went
on to illustrate that a treaty of extradition is an exception to cus-
tomary international law, which does not innately recognize the
right of a nation to extradite its own national from another coun-
try's territory. 168 Examination of the documentary history and
practice under the U.S.-Mexico Extradition treaty failed to re-
veal that forcible abductions were violations of the treaty because
Mexico was made aware of the U.S. position-consistent with
Ker-that forcible abductions occurring outside the U.S. to bring
a criminal into American territory was acceptable under Ameri-
can law. 169
Finally, the Court deciphered whether an implicit unarticu-
lated term of the treaty prohibited "prosecution where the defen-
dant's presence is obtained by means other than those estab-
lished by the Treaty."170 The Court noted that general customary
international law firmly prohibited forcible abductions. 171 "This,
however, does not mean that the violation of any principle of in-
ternational law constitutes a violation of this particular
treaty."172 The Court, therefore, declined to imply a prohibition
on all forms of seizing an individual from the land of another
country. 173
The conflict between rights in Alvarez-Machain is between the
constitutional right of due process and the treaty right to extradi-
tion proceedings where a criminal defendant is found. Both in-
timate fundamental rights of the individual to receive fair proc-
ess to ensure justice occurs. The Court resolves the conflict by
strict textual reading of the provisions of the U.S.-Mexico Ex-
tradition treaty. The absence of express prohibition of the type of
167 Id. at 664 (stating that Article 9 of the treaty does not specify the manner in which
either country should extradite a national of the other country in order to prosecute him).
168 Id. at 664-65 (explaining that international law imposes no requirement that one
country must surrender its nationals for prosecution in another country, and therefore a
treaty may provide a mechanism for extradition that otherwise would not exist).
169 Id. at 665 (noting Mexico knew of the Ker doctrine as early as 1906 and did not seek
insertion of language to curtail this American rule in the latest treaty executed in 1978).
170 Id. at 666.
171 Id. (describing Alvarez-Machain's argument that the U.N. Charter and OAS Charter
advocate international censure of international abductions).
172 Id. at 668 n.14.
173 Id. at 670 (stating "the fact of respondent's forcible abduction does not therefore pro-
hibit his trial in a Court in the United States for violations of the criminal laws of the
United States").
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conduct employed to bring Alvarez-Machain before U.S. courts,
coupled with the lack of customary international law's recogni-
tion of a similar right, led the Court to infer no such right
claimed by Alvarez-Machain existed. Alvarez-Machain was not a
citizen of the U.S., but Ker was. In a similar factual scenario, the
Court denied an American citizen a determination of violation of
his constitutional right to due process.
Viewed together Ker and Alvarez-Machain adopt a textualist
approach to conflicting rights. Should a right be implied by in-
ternational convention that right yields completely to established
domestic precepts. 174 Where municipal precepts do not require
inquiry into the conflict between rights, examination by the
Court is not required. To borrow from American conflicts of laws
scholarship, the Court implements a similar analysis to that pro-
posed by Brainerd Currie, who suggested: "If the court finds an
apparent conflict between the interests of the two states, it
should reconsider. A more moderate and restrained interpreta-
tion of the policy or interest of one state or the other may avoid
conflict." 175 Although Currie spoke of conflicts of laws between
American states, adoption of the methodology to the present dis-
cussion of conflicts between constitutional rights and treaty
rights explicates the Supreme Court's process of addressing the
conflict in both Ker and Alvarez-Machain. To reformulate Cur-
rie's method, the Supreme Court found an apparent conflict be-
tween a constitutional right and treaty right, and considered a
moderate and restrained interpretation of the rights to avoid con-
flict.
ii. SOUTH AFRICAN JURISPRUDENCE COMPARED
Looking to South African jurisprudence, Grootboom reflects a
similar approach to Ker and Alvarez-Machain. 76 In Grootboom,
the Court addressed Articles 2.1 and 11.1 of The International
174 See generally Detlev F. Vagts, Taking Treaties Less Seriously, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 458
(1998) (noting general American judicial distain for treaty obligations).
17- James P. George, False Conflicts and Faulty Analysis: Judicial Misuse of Govern-
mental Interest in the Second Restatement Conflict of Laws, 23 REV. LITIG. 489, 511-12
(2004) (describing Currie's framework presented in Brainerd Currie, Comments on Bab-
cock v. Jackson: A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1233, 1242-
43 (1963)).
176 Cf. Director of Public Prosecutions, Cape of Good Hope v. Robinson, 2005 (2) BCLR
103 (CC) (discussing an extradition treaty, but not squarely addressing constitutional is-
sues).
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Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the inter-
pretation given to the Articles by The Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights in relation to expounding upon the
constitutional rights to adequate housing and progressive reali-
zation of adequate housing through reasonable legislative meas-
ures. 177 Unlike the Supreme Court, examination of the particular
international convention was mandated pursuant to the South
African Constitution. 178 The Constitutional Court found the
treaty required South Africa to expeditiously and effectively
move toward realization of the socio-economic rights contained
within the Constitution-particularly the realization of all citi-
zens of access to adequate housing. 179 Movement toward the full
realization of this right is interpreted through the state's utiliza-
tion of actually available resources.180
The Court did not find the treaty infringed upon the constitu-
tional right to adequate housing because textually, the rights
utilized different language.' 8 ' The Constitution used the phrase
"right to access adequate housing" whereas the treaty provided a
right to adequate housing.18 2 Additionally, the treaty indicated a
right to appropriate legislative measures whereas the Constitu-
tion required reasonable legislative measures to progressively
realize access to adequate housing for citizens. 8 3 The Court
opined that "international law can be a guide to interpretation
but the weight to be attached to any particular principle or rule
of international law will vary."'8 4
For similar reasons, the Court also rejected the treaty's concept
of a minimum core contained within socio-economic rights be-
177 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976); CESCR General Comment 3, The
Nature of States Parties' Obligations (Art. 2, par.l), E/1991/23 (Dec. 14, 1990), available
at http://www.hri.ca/fortherecordcanada/vol2/obligationtb91.htm (last visited Nov. 4,
2007).
178 Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 26; S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 39 ("(1) When interpreting
the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum ... (b) must consider international law "). Cf.
S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 233.
179 Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 45 (stating that "accessibility should be progressively
facilitated: legal, administrative, operational and financial hurdles should be .. .lowered
over time").
180 Id. at 46 (noting that "the obligation does not require the State to do more than its
available resources permit").
181 Id. at 28 (discussing the difference in language between the Covenant and the
Constitution).
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 26.
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cause varying factual situations delineated the right to access
adequate housing, the Court lacked necessary information about
housing conditions across the country, and (most importantly)
the standard utilized to assess effectuation of the right is the
reasonableness standard found within the South African Consti-
tution. 18 5
Therefore, both the Supreme Court and the Constitutional
Court strictly interpret the text of their constitutions to avoid
conflict between constitutional rights and treaty rights. They ac-
complish this avoidance of conflict by construing the language of
the treaty so that the right granted in the treaty disappears.18 6
There exists only a false conflict between the rights because the
courts find only a constitutional right where both a treaty and
constitutional right seemingly existed before the courts' exegesis.
B. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon (VIENNA Convention on Consular
Relations) Compared to South African Jurisprudence
i. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon
The United States Supreme Court recently dealt with two con-
solidated cases involving the assertion by criminal defendants
that American law enforcement officers failed to advise them of
their Article 36 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations right
to have their consul informed of their detention.'87 In the first
case, defendant Sanchez-Llamas, a citizen of Mexico, was ar-
rested for a 1999 shooting of a police officer in the state of Ore-
gon.188 At the time of his arrest, the defendant was advised in
both English and Spanish of his right to an attorney, right to re-
main silent, and informed that any statements made to the offi-
cers would be used against him in a subsequent criminal prose-
185 Id. at 32-33 (demonstrating that the "differences between city and rural commu-
nities will also determine the needs and opportunities for the enjoyment of this right").
See Liebenburg, supra note 66, at 33 -10 to 33-12.
186 For a European explanation of why American courts disregard or shirk international
obligations, see Andreas L. Paulus, From Neglect to Defiance? The United States and In-
ternational Adjudication, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 783, 802-08, 810-11 (2004) (discussing the
evolution of the Supreme Court's attitude toward international obligations).
187 Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2674 (2006).
188 Id. at 2675-76.
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cution.189 After administering these warnings, police questioned
Sanchez-Llamas in an interview room at the police station with
the assistance of an interpreter. 190 In answering police questions,
Sanchez-Llamas made several incriminating statements. 191
As a result, Sanchez-Llamas was subsequently charged with
attempted murder and other coordinate offenses pursuant to
Oregon state law.192 Before the trial for these charges, Sanchez-
Llamas moved the state court to suppress all incriminating
statements he made to the police in response to police question-
ing when he was first arrested. 93 By such motion, Sanchez-
Llamas sought to invoke the exclusionary rule, which dictates
that "all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation
of the Constitution is . . inadmissible" in a state or federal
prosecution.194
The Supreme Court addressed the appropriateness of the ex-
clusionary rule's use in remedying a violation of the treaty right
to consular notification of a foreign citizen's detention by Ameri-
can authorities. 95 Initially, the Court assumed that there existed
a judicially enforceable individual right to consular notification
applicable to American proceedings through Article 36 of the Vi-
enna Convention. 196 The Court explained that the Vienna Con-
vention did not provide specific detailed remedies for violations of
Article 36, but instead permitted municipal law to provide an ap-
propriate remedy for a violation of the Article under domestic
law. 197 Thus, the availability of the exclusionary rule to suppress
evidence obtained in violation of the Convention must be deter-
189 Id. at 2676. Collectively these rights and statements are referred to as Miranda
warnings and inform an arrestee of his entitlements under the United States Constitu-
tion. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). "[A]Ill persons within the territory of
the United States are entitled to the protection guaranteed by" the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S.
228, 238 (1896).
190 Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2676.
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
195 Sanchez.Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2680-82 (concluding that the exclusionary rule is not
a judicial remedy applied lightly).
196 Id. at 2677-78. In making this assumption the Court did decide such a right existed.
A decision that such a right existed would produce a jurisprudentially binding precedent
that recognized the right and would bind lower courts to effectuate such a right.
197 Id. at 2678.
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mined under domestic law. 198 Because under the American fed-
eral system the Supreme Court does not possess supervisory au-
thority over state court proceedings, a judicial remedy could only
be imposed upon the Oregon state court solely on the basis that
such a remedy is found in the language of the treaty itself.199
Assuming a judicial remedy was required by the Convention,
the Court declared that such remedy must be consistent with the
Convention's requirement that exercise of Convention rights un-
der Article 36 conform to the domestic law of the state in which
effectuation of such rights is sought.200 In conformance with
American law, the exclusionary rule is reserved for violations by
state actors of individual constitutional rights.201 Application of
the rule to mere statutory violations occurs solely when impor-
tant Fourth and Fifth Amendment constitutional rights are im-
plicated, namely when an unreasonable search or seizure occurs
or when a defendant's privilege against self-incrimination is vio-
lated.202
The Court found that a violation of Article 36's treaty right to
consular notification of detention does not implicate any of the
important constitutional rights articulated above and serves no
real deterrent to dissuade state actors from violating the treaty
right.20 3 Furthermore, the defendant was afforded more substan-
tial constitutional protections than mere consular assistance. 20 4
Hence, the Court found other American constitutional protec-
198 Id. The Court noted that none of the other 169 counties who are signatories to the
Convention have the exclusionary rule available as a matter of domestic law. The exclu-
sionary rule, the Court noted, is unique to the American legal system. Id.
199 Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2679 (citing Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428,
438 (2000) and Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221 (1982)). Treaties that are self-
executing are directly applicable to the states through the federal constitution. U.S.
CONST. art. IV.
200 See Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2680 (noting the limits on Sanchez-Llamas' ar-
gument that judicial remedy is required in his case).
201 See id. (explaining Court's application of exclusionary rule to unconstitutional viola-
tions of Fourth Amendment and wrongfully obtained confessions).
202 See id. at 2681 (distinguishing Sanchez-Llamas' situation from cases where statu-
tory violations have resulted in application of exclusionary rule for violations speaking to
Fourth and Fifth Amendment interests).
203 See id. (clarifying Article 36's right to consular notification as a right of foreign na-
tionals to have their consulate informed of their arrest or detention rather than a provi-
sion relating to suppression of evidence).
204 See id. at 2681-82. Sanchez-Llamas received the due process protections afforded to
foreign nationals detained in the U.S. on suspicion of crime. He was given an attorney
paid for by public funds and protected against compelled self-incrimination.
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tions were afforded to Sanchez-Llamas, which served concomi-
tant interests to those protected by Article 36 such that applica-
tion of the exclusionary rule to suppress incriminating state-
ments made to police was not warranted under domestic law. 20 5
In Sanchez-Llamas, the Court returns to the same strict tex-
tual interpretation of the treaty found in Alvarez-Machain.
Unlike Alvarez-Machain and Grootboom, the Court is unable to
dismiss the treaty right by finding only a constitutional right
where both a treaty and a constitutional right previously existed.
Instead, the Court recognizes the treaty right, but asserts that
the constitutional right grants the individual superior protection;
the Court places a greater value on the constitutional right than
on the treaty right.20 6 The constitutional right displaces the
treaty right because the constitutional right occupies a greater
area of entitlement to the individual. Further, the Court identi-
fies that violation of the treaty right does not carry the same
weight as violation of a domestic constitutional right.20 7
The Court resolves conflict between rights by selecting the
right providing the individual greater legal protections. Largely,
this result occurs because the remedy for breach of the treaty
right falls within domestic law. Domestic law does not find
breach of the treaty right valuable, and therefore the treaty right
gives way to the more highly valued constitutional right.
ii. SOUTH AFRICAN JURISPRUDENCE COMPARED
Turning to South Africa, the Constitutional Court revisited the
extent to which Articles 2.1 and 11.1 of the International Cove-
205 See id. (noting availability of diplomatic channels as well as the right to raise an Ar-
ticle 36 claim at trial to obtain consular notification).
206 See Cummins Inc. v. U.S., 454 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Further evidence of
this devaluation of the treaty right may be seen in the opinion describing Sanchez-Llamas
as indicating that deference should not be given to foreign tribunal decisions interpreting
treaty rights, but rather the court should give only "respectful consideration." See gener-
ally Martin A. Rogoff, Application of Treaties and the Decisions of International Tribunals
in the United States and France: Reflections on Recent Practice, 58 ME. L. REV. 405, 427-
33, 470 (2006) (describing background of treaty interpretation in U.S. and noting "the
propensity of American courts to reject or restrict application of provisions of treaties and
international agreements").
207 U.S. v. Abdi, 463 F.3d 547, 556 (6th Cir. 2006) ("Mhe rights protected by the Vienna
Convention are equivalent to the rights protected by a statute because treatises and stat-
utes have been held by the Supreme Court to be 'on the same footing' with each other un-
der the Constitution") (quoting United States v. Chaparro-Alcantara, 226 F.3d 616, 621-
22 (7th Cir. 2000)).
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nant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the interpre-
tation given to the Articles by The Committee on Economic, So-
cial and Cultural Rights, related to constitutional rights.208 In
this case, the Court asserted that prior decisions concluded the
"socio-economic rights of the Constitution should not be con-
strued as entitling everyone to demand that the minimum core
be provided to them. Minimum core was thus treated as possibly
being relevant to reasonableness under Section 26(2), and not as
a self-standing right conferred on everyone under Section
26(1)."209 The Court, to determine whether the treaty right to
minimum core applied, examined the constitutional rights to ac-
cess to healthcare and to reasonable legislative measures to pro-
vide citizens access to health care. 210 The Court determined that
"all that can be expected of the state, is that it act reasonably to
provide access to the socio-economic rights identified in Sections
26 and 27 on a progressive basis."211 Reaffirming courts constitu-
tionally are ill equipped to define a minimum core, 212 the Court
found, Section 27(1) of the Constitution does not give rise to a
self-standing and independent positive right enforceable irre-
spective of the considerations mentioned in Section 27(2). Sec-
tions 27(1) and 27(2) must be read together as defining the scope
of the positive rights that everyone has and the corresponding ob-
ligations on the state to "respect, protect, promote and fulfil [sic]"
such rights. The rights conferred by Sections 26(1) and 27(1) are
to have "access" to the services that the state is obliged to provide
in terms of Sections 26(2) and 27(2).213
The Court, therefore, firmly rejected any additional obligations
placed upon the state as a result of the terms of the rights
granted in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights. Such treaty rights did not modify the constitu-
208 See Minister of Health and Others v. Treatment Action Campaign and Others, 2002
(10) BCLR 1 (CC) (S. Afr.) [hereinafter TAC].
209 Id. at T 34.
210 See S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 2, § 27(1)-(2) (noting provisions declaring every citizen's
right to health care, food, water and social security in South Africa's Bill of Rights); see
also TAC, supra note 208, at 35 (requiring access to socio-economic rights to improve
the poverty conditions existing at the time of the Constitution's adoption).
211 TAC, supra note 208, at 35.
212 See TAC, supra note 208, at 38 (highlighting judiciary's ill-suitedness to decide is-
sues with potentially great socio-economic impact).
213 TAC, supra note 208, at 39.
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tional rights of an individual nor provide additional justiciable
individual rights.
The Sanchez-Llamas decision varies from the above-described
South African opinion in that the Supreme Court finds one right
more valuable than another. The South African Court, in a revi-
sion of its earlier declaration in Grootboom, finds the treaty right
present but impossible to enforce judicially because of the limita-
tions on the judicial branch of government. The Constitutional
Court does not expressly state that the constitutional rights en-
compass a broader scope of protection that engulfs the treaty
rights, as does the Sanchez-Llamas Court.
Like the Sanchez-Llamas Court, the Constitutional Court
views the remedy of breach of the treaty right as impractical
within the judicial system. Both Courts express more regard for
domestic constitutional rights than international treaty rights
based upon explicit constitutional text and deference of the treaty
text to municipal remedies.214
C. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (Geneva Convention III) Compared to
South African Jurisprudence
i. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
A prisoner at the Guantanamo Bay detention facility, whom
the President of the United States determined by Executive Dec-
laration necessitated trial by military commission, challenged the
method of trial through writs of habeas corpus and mandamus. 215
The prisoner raised two principle violations of law: first, the
method of trial by military commission was not provided for by
statute or congressional act and violated common law; and sec-
ond, the procedures to be utilized by the military commission vio-
214 See Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2679 (pointing to authority under United States
Constitution to make treaties which are to be interpreted according to their terms); see
also TAC, supra note 208, at 26 (explaining constitutional requirement that each indi-
vidual have "minimum core" rights).
215 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2759 (2006) (summarizing Hamdan's de-
tention and charges of "offenses triable by military commission"). See generally Military
Order: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Ter-
rorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001) (outlining authority under which President
acted against individuals perceived to be connected to terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001).
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lated both American military law and international law. 216 Only
the second contention concerns the present discussion as it re-
lates to a right created in international law conflicting with a
federal right.
The prisoner received a military lawyer appointed to represent
him before the military commission. That appointed lawyer filed
a petition with the Secretary of Defense's appointee, retired ma-
jor general and attorney John D. Altenberg, Jr., for charges to be
filed and a speedy trial commenced. 217 The petition was denied
and the appointed military lawyer filed the writs of habeas cor-
pus and mandamus in a federal district court.218
During this time, a separate tribunal called the Combatant
Status Review Tribunal issued a declaration for continued deten-
tion of the prisoner at Guantanamo Bay because he was an en-
emy combatant. 219 As the filing of writs and the tribunal deter-
mination occurred, the prisoner's trial by military commission
commenced. 220 The Secretary of Defense's appointee in the mean-
time issued a thirteen-paragraph charging document, which ar-
ticulated the charges against the prisoner.221
The prisoner's trial before the military commission was stayed
by order of another federal district court sitting in Washington,
D.C. where the prisoner's writs were transferred. 222 The govern-
ment appealed from the federal district court to the court of ap-
peals, which reversed the order of the federal district court.223 All
the preceding process was afforded to the detainee under Ameri-
can constitutional and statutory law to challenge the process of
the military tribunal.
216 See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2759 (stating Hamdan's objections to the military com-
mission's lack of authority to prosecute him).
217 See id. at 2760 (explaining process by which appointed counsel sought to advocate
for Hamdan's procedural rights).
218 See id. at 2760-61 (outlining course by which Hamdan ultimately wound up in fed-
eral district court after being denied the protection of the UCMJ).
219 See id. at 2761 (stating grounds for Hamdan's continued detention).
220 See id. (highlighting Hamdan's multiple procedural courses).
221 See id. at 2760-61. This document was issued after the Appointee's legal advisor had
denied that the prisoner was entitled to process pursuant to the United States Military
Code of Justice and after the prisoner's appointed attorney filed the federal writs. It con-
tained thirteen paragraphs, yet "[o]nly the final two paragraphs, entitled 'Charge: Con-
spiracy,' contain allegations against Hamdan." Id.
222 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2760; Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D.D.C.
2004).
223 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2762; Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
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The United States Supreme Court opined that military com-
missions are not found within the strictures of the Constitution
or mandated by federal legislative statute. 224 These tribunals are
created of necessity, but "[e]xigency alone, of course, will not jus-
tify the establishment and use of penal tribunals not contem-
plated by Article I, Section 8 and Article III, Section 1 of the Con-
stitution unless some other part of that document authorizes a
response to the felt need."225 The Court found the President pos-
sessed a general authority, absent specific congressional act, to
convene military commissions when justified under the U.S.
Constitution and federal laws. 226 Hence, the procedure adopted
by the military commission must comply with the Constitution
and federal law, which includes the law of nations as implicated
by the U.S. Code of Military Justice. 227 The law of nations in-
cludes, particularly, the Third Geneva Convention on Treatment
of Prisoners of War.228
The detainee, therefore, possessed rights under the federal
constitution and law as well as rights under international con-
vention. As to federal law, the rights granted to the detainee by
the military commission were pursuant to Commission Order No.
1.229 The Court determined that the procedures set out in Order
No. 1 must afford the detainee rules similar to those governing
courts-martial unless such similarity is impracticable. 230 The
President asserted that rules similar to those applied to federal
224 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2772-73. The U.S. Congress has subsequently enacted the
Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (Oct. 17, 2006)
explicitly authorizing trial by military commissions.
225 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2773. Authority to establish military commission is shared
between Congress and the President. The Court declined to definitively answer when the
President, in times of controlling necessity, may constitute military commissions without
congressional mandate. Id. at 2774.
226 Id. at 2775.
227 Id. at 2786 ("The UCMJ conditions the President's use of military commissions on
compliance not only with the American common law of war, but also with the rest of the
UCMJ itself, insofar as applicable, and with the 'rules and precepts of the law of na-
tions"'); Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (2006).
228 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2786 (indicating that all four of the Geneva Conventions
signed in 1949 are applicable); Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364.
229 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2786 (giving an account of the detainee's procedural rights).
230 Id. at 2791 ("[The rules set forth in the Manual for Courts-Martial must apply to
military commissions unless impracticable.").
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criminal trials were impracticable in the detainee's situation.231
But the President made no similar determination that applica-
tion of the procedures in courts-martial would be impractica-
ble. 232 Hence, the procedures applicable to courts-martial under
federal law should govern the detainee's trial by military com-
mission and afford him a greater panoply of rights than does Or-
der No. 1.233
The procedures set out in Order No. 1 also violated Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. 234 Common Article 3 applies
to conflicts not of an international character, but the Court inter-
preted the article broadly to encompass situations like the armed
conflicted waged by the United States against terrorist organiza-
tions.235 Therefore, the article granted to the detainee the right in
international law to "be tried by a 'regularly constituted court af-
fording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indis-
pensable by civilized peoples."' 236 Because military commissions
are authorized by exigency and permitted to deviate from the
procedures of courts-martial, and no such exigency has been es-
tablished, Order No. 1 violates the detainee's international legal
right to a regularly constituted court. 237
Here, unlike pervious cases discussed in this part, the Court
finds the treaty right and its violation necessitate judicial en-
forcement of the right.238 Yet, enforcement of the right occurs
only after the Court found constitutional rights equally violated.
231 Id. ("[T]he President's determination that [there is a] 'danger to the safety of the
United States,' . . . renders it impracticable 'to apply in military commissions ... the prin-
ciples of law and rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the
United States district courts").
232 Id. at 2792 ("Nothing in the record before us demonstrates that it would be impracti-
cable to apply court-martial rules in this case.").
233 Id at 2792-93 (holding violation of American federal law to have occurred).
234 Id. at 2793, 2795 (interpreting Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and
holding that there was a violation of them).
235 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2795-97 (citing General Commentaries to Article 3).
236 Id. at 2796 (quoting Common Article 3 contained in the Third Geneva Convention);
Third Geneva Convention, 6 U.S.T., at 3320.
237 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2797 (discussing what "regularly constituted court" means
under the Geneva Conventions).
238 For two divergent views of how the case should have been decided, see Neal K.
Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals,
111 YALE L.J. 1259 (2002) (arguing for a similar outcome to the Court's actual decision)
and Geoffrey Corn, Taking the Bitter with The Sweet: A Law of War Based upon Military
Commission, 35 STETSON L. REV. 811 (arguing despite some procedural and jurispruden-
tial deficiencies, military commissions are permissible under Constitution and interna-
tional law).
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Nonetheless, the Court resolves conflict between treaty and con-
stitutional rights in this case by enforcing both rights because
each right occupies a similar scope of application to the guaran-
tees secured to the prisoner. Both treaty and constitutional
rights harmoniously coexist because both point toward the same
end. That end is fair procedures in the trial of the prisoner.239
The Court, then, views the rights as coextensive and permits
each right to function within the realm of the other to maximize
the rights granted to the prisoner.
ii. SOUTH AFRICAN JURISPRUDENCE COMPARED
Unlike Alvarez-Machain and Grootboom, the Court finds a con-
flict and resolves the conflict by harmonization of the conflicting
rights. Like Sanchez-Llamas and the South African case com-
pared to it in the previous subSection, the Court recognizes the
treaty right, but this Court takes the further step of finding that
right actionable. 240
IV. UNIVERSAL METHOD TO RESOLVE CONFLICTS BETWEEN
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
The problem of conflicting rights occurs because of their ex-
plicit description, codification, and enumeration in constitutions,
treaties, and other laws. Early American constitutional framers
argued against listing rights in this manner to avoid limiting
rights solely to those collected within a legal text. 241 The problem
of conflicting rights occurs because rights are both written with
vague terminology and incapable of strict definition. Largely,
rights grew out of philosophical and theological theory, which
sought to maximize individual benefits against oppressive gov-
239 Cf. Erwin Chemerinsky, In Guantanamo Case, Justices Rein in Executive Power,
TRIAL 60, 61-62 (September 2006) (describing holding in the case).
240 Cf. Martin S. Flaherty, More Real than Apparent: Separation of Power, The Rule of
Law, and Comparative Executive "Creativity" in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 2006 CATO Sup.
CT. REV. 51, 72 (2006) (arguing present day international law requires "states [to] provide
meaningful domestic remedies for individual treaty rights").
241 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Hamilton); see also S. DOG. NO. 108-17, at 1605-06
(2002). "Aside from contending that a Bill of Rights was unnecessary, the Federalists re-
sponded to those opposing ratification of the Constitution because of the lack of a declara-
tion of fundamental rights by arguing that inasmuch as it would be impossible to list all
rights it would be dangerous to list some because there would be those who would seize on
the absence of the omitted rights to assert that government was unrestrained as to those."
Id. at 1605.
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ernment.242 The solution to the problem, however, is not to erase
the provisions guaranteeing rights in constitutions, treaties, and
other laws.
To resolve conflicts between fundamental rights, no matter
which rights are in conflict, a universal method is necessary.
Such a method must be flexible and uncomplicated to resolve di-
verse conflicts between varieties of rights. Having analyzed
methods implemented by two courts of final appeal in a diversity
of factual situations to different types of conflicting rights, a uni-
versal method to decide conflicts between rights arises.
The underlying precept of a universal method is that all rights
are not equal. Rights exist at differing levels of importance in a
given legal text. Some rights are essential to the government's
relationship with its citizens, while others administrate the citi-
zen-government association. Determination of fundamental
rights falls to the legal text under evaluation. The text itself may
provide for a way to resolve a conflict between rights by indicat-
ing one right is not fundamental. This, however, does not solve
conflicts between fundamental rights, but permits a court to dis-
pense with a conflict between rights should the legal text under
interpretation indicate that one right is not fundamental-and
therefore the non-fundamental right yields to the fundamental
right.
The universal method courts may apply to resolve conflicts be-
tween fundamental rights follows:
1. Identify the specific fundamental rights in conflict;
2. Evaluate each fundamental right against the back-
ground of the legal text containing the right;
3. Establish the aim, goal, or end of the right and whether
that end is achieved under the factual scenario presented;
4. Look to whether both rights may harmoniously coexist
through equal enforcement;
242 See generally Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Canonistic Contribution to the Western Rights
Tradition: An Historical Inquiry, 33 B.C. L. REV. 37 (1991) (describing philosophical and
theological theories giving rise to modern concept of rights).
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5. If rights cannot coexist, then resolve the conflict by ap-
plying the most rational and pragmatic construction of the
rights to establish an amalgamated solitary right employ-
ing the most significant ends of the two conflicting rights.
The universal method described above implements the key
theories articulated by the United States Supreme Court and
South African Constitutional Court described in this work.
The first precept recognizes the necessity to explicitly define
which rights are in conflict. The precept also allows a court to
undertake further inquiry to remove an apparent conflict be-
tween rights. The second precept encourages the court to classify
each right within the purview of the legal text (constitution,
treaty, statute, etc.) guaranteeing the right. A solution to the
conflict may be found by reference to the doctrines behind codifi-
cation of rights within the legal text. The third precept forces the
court- to consider the policy behind the right, as well as the func-
tion of the right within the greater governmental scheme. The
court must ask what the right protects because the second prin-
ciple causes the court to examine why the right is present. The
fourth precept recognizes fundamental rights require equal re-
spect. Resolving conflict by harmonizing fundamental rights,
thus preserving rights in equal value and effect, is preferable to
the fifth and final recommendation. 243
The fifth precept acknowledges that harmonizing fundamental
rights in conflict is not always possible. If one right must cede
value to another, then reason and practicality provide the tools to
forge a singular reformulated right that retains the previously
separate ends of each right. The fifth precept recognizes conflict
resolution is preferable to indecision. One right arises from two
rights by taking the ends of each separate right and placing those
ends within the same right. An example of this process is found
in Grootboom's amalgamation of the right to adequate housing
243 The German constitutional doctrine of "practical concordance" accords with my
fourth precept. See KONRAD HESSE, GRUNDZOGE DES VERFASSUNGSRECHTS DER
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 142 (20th ed. 1999). "According to... [practical concor-
dance], constitutionally protected legal values must be harmonized with one another in
the event of their conflict. One may not be realized at the total expense of the other. Both
are to be preserved in creative tension with one another." Donald P. Kommers, Sympo-
sium, German Constitutionalism: A Prolegomenon, 40 EMORY L.J. 837, 851 (1991).
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and the right to effectuate that right through reasonable legisla-
tive measures previously described in Part II.
Again, the problem of conflicting rights is inherent because of
the codification of rights. Solving these inherent conflicts is diffi-
cult. Resolution of conflicts between fundamental rights through
the universal method provides a good solution to the conundrum.

